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MAHONEY v. BEATMAN: A STUDY IN PROXIMATE CAUSE
The very able attempt of the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
the majority speaking through Chief Justice Wheeler, the
minority through Justice Maltbie, in the recent case of Maluney
v. Beatmuma,' to deal rationally with the concept of "proximate
cause," warrants a consideration of that question as involved
'110 Conn. 185, 147 AtI. 762 (1929).
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in this specific case. The Connecticut court through its Chief
Justice is contributing so much to the restatement of tort law
by the American Law Institute that any disagreement with the
views of the court must be and is stated with the greatest
deference. The development of the case well illustrates a point
often insisted upon, i.e., that there is no one way of stating in
terms of legal theory a desired conclusion. Legal theory is too
rich, in content not to afford alternative ways, and frequently
several of them, for stating an acceptable judgment. The only
purpose further discussion can serve is to simplify the statement
of theory so that it may not thwart judgment, nor make the
articulation of judgment seem too strained.
The case is not unusually complex. The trial court found
that the defendant while proceeding northerly drove his car
across the center of the road and onto the left hand side, so
that the plaintiff who was driving rapidly in the opposite di-
rection was forced off the concrete onto the shoulder of the
road. Despite this giving of ground, the defendant's car struck
the hub of the left front wheel of the plaintiff's car. The
plaintiff's chauffeur lost control of the car and it swerved in
a circle to the left and crashed into a tree and stone fence on
the opposite side of the road. The trial court stated the follow-
ing conclusions: "(1) The defendant's car was on the wrong
side of the road. (2) The speed of the plaintiff's car was un-
reasonable but it did not contribute to the collision which was
due entirely to the negligence of the defendant. (3) The speed
did, however, materially hamper the plaintiff's chauffeur in con-
trolling the car after the collision, and owing to it he completely
lost control of it. (4) Since the court was unable to find from
the evidence the amount of damage caused at the time of the
impact, the court found the plaintiff entitled to 'nominal dam-
ages,' which were assessed at $200.'
The points of conflict are developed by a process of elimina-
tion:
(1) The respective duties.
(a) The defendant was under a duty to use reasonable care
to keep to his side of the road so as not to interfere with other
travelers' use of the other side of the road.
(b) The plaintiff was under a duty to drive his car at a
reasonable speed and also to use reasonable care to avoid con-
tact with other travelers, even though they might be on the
wrong side of the road.
Where these duties are found, and why, are not pertinent
inquiries here. That there were such duties is not questioned.




It is merely suggested that the statement in the majority opin-
ion that " probability of injury by one to the legally protected
interests of another is the basis for the law's creation of a duty
to avoid such injury," is not a sufficient statement of the basis
of duties. Duties are governed by more comprehensive factors
than the "probability of harm."3 It is worthy of emphasis that
the jury would have nothing to do with imposing such duties
as are here involved. Such function is that of the court, in the
absence of legislation. But legislation would not be of any
peculiar significance in this case, inasmuch as the court would
impose the same duties as the legislature would.
(2) Violation of duty, i.e., negligence.
(a) That the defendant violated a duty due the plaintiff
seems not to be questioned. The evidence was all one way. There
was nothing to go to a jury (or a judge sitting as a jury) on
this point. In any event, the trial court's conclusion (1) Wos
fully supported.
(b) The plaintiff also violated his duty to drive at a reason-
able speed by driving at an unreasonable speed. This was found
in the first part of conclusion (2). The plaintiff did not, how-
ever, violate his duty to use reasonable efforts to avoid contact
with the defendant's car after it tid crossed to the wrong
side of the road. Indeed, the plaintiff's car turned out upon the
shoulder of the road.
Did the violation of duty by the plaintiff in driving at an
unreasonable speed constitute contributory negligence so as to
defeat recovery? This is left for later discussion.
(3) Damages. There is no question about the full loss suf-
fered by the plaintiff. That is measured by the cost of repairs
for which the plaintiff sought recovery.
(4) Cawal relation. Was there causal relation between the
defendant's violation of duty and the full damages suffered?
That there was such causal relation can not be disputed. But
there were also two other causal factors of importance: (1) the
unreasonable speed of the plaintiff's car, and (2) the loss of
control by the plaintiff's chauffeur. Hence, there were three
outstanding causal factors, all of importance. The trial court
recognized all three factors, as disclosed by conclusions (2) and
(3).
With this analysis of the case, upon what basis shall the
plaintiff be permitted to recover? The points of conflict are
reduced, by this process of elimination, to two, viz., (1) Does
the plaintiff's own violation of duty defeat a full recovery? (2)
Do the cause factors of excessive speed and loss of control defeat
him?
3See for more extended discussion my article, The Duty Poblem in
Neglig r e Cases (1928) 28 CoL. L. Rsv. 1014, 1026.
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Both the trial and appellate courts turned the case on the
second point of conflict. The trial court (conclusion 3) held
that the speed and loss of control by the chauffeur did bar the
plaintiff from a recovery except for the damage done by the
initial impact, while the appellate court held that these cause
factors did not defeat the plaintiff, because the defendants viola-
tion of duty (driving on the wrong side of the road) was a sub-
stantiaZ factor in the total result.
That the appellate court is correct in saying that the defend-
ant's conduct was a substantiaZ factor is unquestionable. It
is quite as certain, however, that the excessive speed and loss of
control were also substantioZ cause factors. It is here suggested
that on the question of causa- recltion, the trial and appellate
courts are at an imp asse. If the question of causal relation were
determinative of the case, the plaintiff could not win. But it is
infrequent indeed that causaZ -reZlation is a determinative issue.
Courts do a wholly useless thing in 99 cases out of 100 in which
they reduce the question to be decided to such a basis. In most
cases it is clear beyond a doubt that there are multiple sub-
stantial cause factors, among which is to be found the defend-
ant's conduct. In the absence of wrongful conduct on the plain-
tiff's part, the inquiry -as to causes should end as soon as it
appears that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor.
If the plaintiff's conduct, as in this case, is seen also to be a sub-
•stantial factor,, then some other basis for determination must
be sought. The attempt to rest the decision upon differences in
degree of causes is futile.
If the case can not be determined on a causal relation question,
due to the fact that both the plaintiff's and the defendant's con-
duct are substantially operative in the total result, can it be
resolved on the first question, viz., did the plaintiff's own viola-
tion of duty defeat him, so as to make the plaintiff bear his
loss rather than throw it upon the defendant? It is suggested
that such is the determinative question in this case. It will be
noted that the trial court found in conclusion (2) that the
plaintift's unreasonable speed did not contribute to the collision.
It was on that basis that the court allowed a recovery for the
damages caused by the initial impact. There are two objections
to this conclusion: First, it is not true; second, the court obvi-
ously confused causal relation and responsibility. The plain-
tiff's unreasonable speed can not be removed from the case
without malting a new one, which was not before the court. The
trial judge doubtless meant that the plaintiff's unreasonable
speed ow7ht not to relieve the defendant of esponsibility for
the initial impact. That is a different matter. But that the
speed did in fact contribute to the collision can not be eliminated
from the case without destroying the case as it was presented
1930] 535
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to the court. A second's difference in the plaintiff's rate of speed
and the case would have been a different one. A physical fact
as one of the data to be dealt with in a case ought never to be
disputed; on the other hand, it ought to be accepted unflinchingly
even though it impose great difficulty.
This erroneous conclusion happens to be of no significance.
It is not the fact of initial collision which is in litigation, but it
is the completed series, the total injury, the wrecked car of the
plaintiff which cost $5,850 to repair. Did the unreasonable
speed of the plaintiff contribute to this total loss? The trial
court made a finding that such 'speed didocontribute to the loss
of control by the chauffeur and thence to the total loss. Hence,
we have the plaintiff's own negligence contributing materially
(a synonym for substantially) to the full loss for which the
plaintiff is seeking recovery.
How can the plaintiff escape the defense of contributory negli-
gence? It is respectfully submitted that this was the question
which the court had before it and that the court did not have
before it any doubtful question of causal relation. This is the
position taken by. Justice Maltbie in his dissent. It is readily
conceded, however, that when such a question as is here in-
volved arises, courts habitually deal with it under the head of
proximate cause. "Proximate cause" and "causal relation" have
not even the remotest kinship. They present wholly different
problems. Until that fact is recognized, it is believed that there
can be no successful discussion of the cases. The use of the term
"cause" sometimes leads courts to confuse the two. The sub-
stantial factor formula is useful only in ascertaining causal
relation. It has no place in determining "proximate cause," as
that term is used in the overwhelming number of situations.4
To the extent that the majority opinion attempted to employ
the "substantial factor" formula other than as a test of causal
relation, it is of doubtful validity. The observation of import-
ance, however, is that in whatever way the question as here
involved is treated, whether as contributory negligence or proxi-
mate cause, it is a question of limitation upon the defendant's
duty. It is thus a question for the crnrt and not for the jury.
Shall the fact that the plaintiff drove at an unreasonable speed
which contributed to his hurt limit the defendant's responsi-
bility under his duty not to cross on to the plaintiff's side of
the road?
It is believed that the determination of the question depends
upon the respective scope of the duties which the respective
parties violated. The duty violated by the defendant was clearly
4 In my article, Are There Dependable Rules of, Causation (1929) '77 U
OF PA. L. REv. 601, this point is elaborated at length.
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for the protection of travelers using the other side of the road.
He therefore should pay for the damage he caused the plaintiff
unless the duty violated by the plaintiff-excessive speed-in
.some way limited the defendant's duty. Was this duty which
the plaintiff violated imposed for the purpose of protecting the
-defendant while he was on the wrong side Qf .the road? This
would be the result if the defendant should not be made to pay.
The majority of the court in effect answers the question in the
negative. The idea is often expressed by the statement that
"a person does not have to anticipate that another will violate
his duty." The plaintiff is in a position to invoke this theory.
Under his duty to the defendant not to speed, he was not re-
quired to take into account the risk that just as he was passing
the defendant, the latter would turn on to the wrong side of the
road. Thus the plaintiff's duty did not comprehend the risk which
in fact he encountered. That is in substance the holding of the
court.
It might be asked: Why will not the same theory work in
behalf of the defendant? Was his duty not to drive on the
wrong side of the road for the purpose of protecting the plain-
tiff while he was speeding? If the defendant were suing the
plaintiff, the inquiry would be pertinent upon the question of
conta-ibutory negligence. In such a case, it is believed that it
would be generally held that the defendant's duty not to turn
into the plaintiff's path was to protect the plaintiff from a
collision whether he was standing still, speeding, or what not.
The defendant is thus not in a position to invoke the theory
in question as a defense. His duty was to stby on his side of the
road. He saw the plaintiff on the other side, probably appreci.
ated the fact that he was driving rapidly, and instead of taking
care to keep away he inadvertently turned into the plaintiff's
path. The fact that the plaintiff was a wrongdoer himself did
not thereby suspend the defendant's duty. If anything, the
defendant's duty was all the more imperative as indicated by
the "last clear -chance" doctrine, which prevents defendants
from having an "open season" upon plaintiffs who are caught in
a negligent position.
Thus, the two duties have different scopes; they comprehend
different risks. The violation of one can not be set off as a de-
fense to the violation of the other, even though both violations
admittedly contributed to the same result. An illustration may
make the point clearer:
Suppose P is hunting on Sunday. While walking down the
road with his gun, the defendant negligently drives his car so
as to run over P. Can the defendant set up P's violation of the
Sunday law as a defense? Most courts would say No, on the
ground, confused though it be, that the violation of the Sunday
1930]
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law had nothing to do with the result (was not a proximate cause
of it) .i While this gets the desired conclusion, it is poor theory.
The violation of the Sunday law was a substantial cause factor
in every sense of that term, but the two rules, the one which P
was violating and the one which the defendant violated had
different purposes, and imposed duties on different planes, and
even though P's presence is accounted for by his unlawful con-
duct on. Sunday, such is no defense. The prohibition against
hunting on Sunday was not designed to relieve the defendant
from the responsibility in driving his car with reference to P,
even though P was engaged in unlawful conduct while on the
highway. Likewise, it can be said in the instant case that the
prohibition against P's excessive speed was not designed to re-
lieve the defendant from his negligence in driving over on P's
side of the road so as to collide with P's speeding car. The point
may well be a close one, but legal theories bring plaintiffs and
defendants into just such close places when the facts of the case
require it. It is believed to be better to face the situation, though
a hard one, and deal with it rationally, even though the drawing
of very close lines is required.
In this connection it is well to consider Smithwiolo v. Hall &
Upson Co.,' relied upon by Justice Maltbie in his dissent. In
that case the same sort of question was involved as in the present
case, and the court likewise translated it into a problem of proxi-
mate cause. An analysis of this case heretofore made is
pertinent:
"PlaiAtiff, an employee of defendant, ventured out on a part
of a platform used in connection with an ice house where it wa's
very dangerous to work. He had been warned not to work out
there as he might fall or slip, and it being unprotected by rail-
ings he would be thrown below and hurt. While the plaintiff
was out on this dangerous part of the platform, the brick wall
of the building above the platform, in consequence of the negli-
gence of defendant, gave way, the brick falling upon the platform
where plaintiff was and thence to the ground. Plaintiff was
struck by the brick and thrown to the ground. As a defense
to a suit for his injuries, defendant invoked plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence. The court spends considerable time speculat-.
ing whether plaintiff's wrongful conduct had anything to do
with his injuries, that is, whether it was 'one of the proximate
causes and not merely a condition.' Finally the court concludes:
"'Whether the claim that he would probably not have fallen
had he remained where he was stationed be true or not, must
forever remain matter of conjecture. But if its truth could be
demonstrated it would not, as we have seen, change the relation
of the plaintiff's act to the legal cause of his injury, or make
5 Ibid. 615 et seq.
(59 Conn. 261, 21 AtI. 924 (1890).
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that act, from a legaZ standpoint, a contributing cause where
it was but a condition.'
"In other words, not being able honestly to say that plain-
tiff's conduct was not one of the causes of his injuries, the court
resorts to a fiction, 'legal cause,' which has often been employed
in such situations, as a way out of the difficulty. This fiction
is wholly useless if the problem is fully analysed. Fictions serve
good purposes only when there is nothing better. They obscure
rational thought process. Any 'constructive' or 'legal' or 'in law'
device for reaching a conclusion is justly the subject of suspicion.
The way out for the court in this situation is very clear. It is
this. The rule (duty) that plaintiff violated (needlessly expos-
ing himself to an unprotected platform) was not designed to
relieve the defendant from its obligation owed to its employee
to furnish him a reasonably safe place (building) about which
to work. The purpose of the common law rule which plaintiff
violated did not go that far; the hazard towards -which it was
directed was entirely different, to-wit, the hazard of slipping
off an unprotected platform while engaged about his work, not
the hazard of being orushed under bficks from a collacpsec dwaU
of the building. Plaintiff did not become an outlaw by being
contributorily negligent. His negligence did put him in a
dangerous place and contributed to his hurt. But irrespective
'of such causal relation, defendant's obligation as to the safety
of the wall was in no wise affected. Plaintiff was still entitled
to its protection. The court was called upon to define the scope
of the respective rules involved. They could not be offset one
against the other. If the rule which a plaintiff has violated does
not give a defendant relief from an obligation owing plaintiff im-
posed by some other rule of law, then such contributory negli-
gence, however clear a causal relation can be traced between it
and plaintif's hurt, affords defendant no ground of defense.
The respective rights and duties of the parties are turned on
much more important factors than mere causal relations." 7
So far in this discussion, the only thing which has been done
is to rationalize a conclusion which the majority of the court
reached and which the writer finds entirely acceptable. In order
that each step could be followed, the discussion has been detailed.
The statement of the analysis could be greatly abbreviated if it
were not for the desirability of indicating the differences between
this analysis and the court's analysis. It can be quicdy formu-
lated in terms of legal theory: Does the plaintiff's contributory
negligence relieve the defendant from responsibility for the loss
which the plaintiff suffered? A negative answer can be as
qulkly given, based upon the legal theory that the respective
duties violated by the respective parties comprehend different
sorts of risks and therefore one can not be offset against the
other.
It will be observed that this rationalization tells little if any
7My articIe, Contributory Negligence and Proximte Cause (1927) 6
N. C. L. REV. 1, 17.
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more as to the, factors which control the conclusion than does
the rationalization of the court disclose the basis of the court's
conclusion. In both instances, the basis of judgment has been
effectually concealed in terms of legal theory. Legal theory,
however, is ordinarily sufficient for the purposes of lawyers, and
that being true, the profession quickly comes to feel that it is
legal theory which compels judgment, when as a matter of fact
it merely articulates judgment. Hence the question, why make
the defendant pay for this loss rather than leave it where it
fell, is still untouched.
If it were the judgment of the court that the plaintiff be
denied recovery, legal theory would lend itself to that judgment
with equal facility as it does to the judgment which the court
actually gave. Under the theory of the trial court, the plaintiff
would have contributed to the full loss; hence, he should recover
only for the damage done by the first impact. Under the ap-
pellate court's theory, either the judge (or a jury) could have
found substantial causal relation between the total loss and the
original impact. Under the dissenting opinion the case could
have gone back to the trial court for determination of the rela-
tion between the plaintiff's negligence and the total loss. Under
the analysis here suggested, the court could say with good reason
that the scope of the plaintiff's duty comprehended just such a
risk as that of another traveler crowding the center of the road
at the moment of passing, and that the duty of reasonable speed
was to eliminate just such risks from highway travel. An
opposite judgment in such a case could therefore be articulated
in numerous terms, and as such be wholly consistent with sound
legal theory. But however articulated, no particular method
would tell the story of what determined the judgment. The
factors which control judgment show dimly through the termin-
ology of legal theory.
What then compels the conclusion that the defendant should
bear the loss in this case? It is suggested, but with' no insist-
ence, that the factors of administration, morals (fault), and
prevention of harm have very .little part to play. But it can
not be said that they are entirely absent. The ease of adminis-
tration forbids that the court enter upon the attempt to appor-
tion the damages according to the degrees of fault. This is
reflected in Chief Justice Wheeler's reliance upon Pollock's
dictum in Greenland v. Chaplin. 8 It is the same idea that caused
courts to reject the doctrine of *comparative negligence which
they felt involved the cumbersome idea of "degrees of negli-
gence." Administration therefore requires that the loss be
8 5 Ex. 243 (1850).
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thrown as an entirety one way or the other, and to that extent
it was a factor in this case.
The morality involved is almdst equalized, owing to the fact
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were law breakers.
But not quite so. The inconsiderate handling of a powerful
vehicle so as to come into the path of a like rapidly moving
machine is of a little deeper dye than the excessive speeding of a
machine along a paved country highway. To that extent the
current notion of "fault" is involved in the case.
The prevention of harm as a general policy is reflected in both
rules which were violated. Both are designed to reduce the
number of traffic accidents. Any weight put upon one would
call for an equal insistence upon the other. Hence, the pre-
ventive factor in a case of two motorists, both of whom have
violated traffic rules, does not contribute anything of signific-
ance.
On the other hand, the economic factor, i.e., the part that
modern machinery and speed play in our everyday life, would
seem to have great weight. The current attitude in this direction
in the matter of traffic is somewhat indicated by the removal of
arbitrary speed limits by legislatures, especially in communities
having good roads. Fast travel is an urgent demand of modern
life. We dare not penalize it too severely.
Also the factor of capacity to bear loss plays a large part.
It may be true in a particular case that the plaintiff is the owner
of a Rolls Royce, while the defendant has a less costly machine,
but the risks of traffic harms are so great under the best con-
ditions and so easily shifted by insurance, that the courts reflect
the general feeling that the operator of one vehicle who by its
mismanagement interferes with that of another ought to bear
the risk despite the fact that the person hurt may also be an
offender in some other particular. The tendency toward insur-
ance for all traffic harms without reference to fault is reflected
-more and more in traffic decisions. Since such harms are in-
evitable and can not be apportioned with precision on any basis
of fault, both good administration and good economics would
require that they be adjusted on some more practical basis.
These and other considerations are hard to focus, and courts
are wise in refusing to deal with them in an open fashion except
where they are very clear and exacting. Nevertheless, the fact
that such considerations in varying complexity do influence the
judgments of courts as well as other citizens ought to be accepted
on all hands. Likewise, the value and functions of intellectual
machinery, such as the negligence network of theories through
which to articulate such judgments without the necessity of dis-
closing the difficulties of arriving at them, should be recognized.
The acceptance of such a viewpoint takes much of the load off
1930]
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legal theory and permits a tolerance towards the articulation
of judgment which is not greatly disturbed by the fear that the
integrity of any particular brand of legal theory is thereby
threatened.
In concluding, it is well to note that Chief Justice Wheeler
observes with great force that much of the reasoning indulged
in by legal writers is too abstruse to submit to a jury. That
observation is valid, but the saving point is that it is seldom,
if ever, required that the questions involving such abstruse
reasoning shall be submitted to the jury. Such matters are
ordinarily for the court, as is true in this very case. The jury
questions in a negligence case are relatively simple. Certainly,
juries have nothing to do with imposing duties or defining them.
Their functions come in passing on the issues of negligence,
causal relation and damages.9 The practice of submitting
"proximate cause" to the jury is usually both erroneous and
futile. It is erroneous because most courts when they talk about
proximate cause are dealing with some phase of the duty
problem and not causal relation. It is futile, inasmuch as the
proximate cause formula is the same formula as the negligence
foranula, but phrased in slightly different words. The usual
result is that the issue of negligence is merely submitted twice
in the same case, once in terms of negligence and again in terms
of "proximate cause." Both variations of the formula are based
on "foreseeability of harm by the man of ordinary prudence."
Even where the courts hold there is no negligence issue, as in
the case of the violation of a statute, they nevertheless some-
times submit that issue under the guise of "proximate cause."
Any close analysis of the two formulas will reveal their identity.
The outstanding contribution in the case under discussion is
the approval the court gives to the "substantial factor formula"
devised by Jeremiah Smith as a means of getting a jury's verdict
on the issue of causal relation. While such issue seldom arises,
when it does arise it properly falls within the functions of a
jury. The formula is steadily gaining headway as a means of
translating the problems of causal relation to the jury for
determination.
LEoN Gnmu.
STIPULATIONS RELIEVING BANKS FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FAILURE TO OBEY STOP-PAYMENT ORDERS
When a depositor has given his bank notice not to honor a
check drawn upon it, and the bank thereafter inadvertently pays
the holder, the uniform course of decision is that the bank does
9 See the formula developed in my article, op. cit. supra note 2.
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so at its peril," the theory being that since the check does not
operate as an assignment pro tanto of the depositor's funds,2 the
order to pay is merely executory and may be countermanded at
any time before the bank has obligated itself to pay by accept-
ance or ceitification.3 Failure to obey the order, therefore,
places the bank in such a position that it assumes the risks (1) of
taking an entire loss as to the mbney paid out, since it probably
will not be able to charge the drawer,' or recover back from the
holder; 5 and (2) of rendering itself responsible in damages to
the drawer for slander of credit,6 or for false imprisonment.
nAmerican Defense Society v. Sherman Nat. Bank, 225 N. Y. 506, 122
N. B. 695 (1919); Elliott v. Worcester Trust Co-., 189 Mass. 542, '15 N. E.
94 (1905); Pease & Dwyer v. State Nat. Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 88 S. W.
172 (1905); Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank, 113 Tex. 100, 252 S. W. 161 (1923);
2 icHmE, BANKS & BANInMG (1913) § 139; 1 MORSE, BANKS & BANKIG
(5th ed. 1928) § 397; BRADY, BANzK CHECKS (2d ed. 1926) § 214.2 Before the passage of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law some
ten states regarded a check as an assignment. I WzLisrox , CONTRACTS
(1920) § 425, n. 6. In such states a stop-payment order was ineffectual
so long, at least, as the check was in the hands of a bona fide holder. Gage
Hotel Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 171 IM. 531, 49 N. E. 420, 39 L. R. A. 477
(1898); Loan and Savings Bank v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 74 S. C.
210, 54 S. E. 364 (1906). Section 189 of the N. I. L., providing that a
check is not an assignment, -ould seem t6 remove the objection to stop-
payment orders. As to the effect of this section in states previously re-
garding a check as an assignment see BRANNv NEGOrT rm INsTRaNTS
LAW (4th ed. 1926) § 189.
3 After certification it is generally held that a stop-payment order is in-
effective, -whether the check has been certified at the request of the drawer
before delivery to the payee or at the request of the payee or other holder.
MoRsE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 399; BRADY, op. cit supra note 1, § 247.
-As to this matter there seems to be a great deal of confusion. Three
possible theories have been advanced upon which it might be possible to
allow the bank to charge the dra-wer: (1) quasi-contract, based upon the.
theory of unjust enrichment; (2) subrogation, and (3) treating the bank,
as a holder. But objections may be raised to each of these theories. For
a case reflecting the conflicting opinions on the subject, see . & K. Trim-
ming Co. v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 127 Misc. 27, 215 X. Y. Supp. 269 (Sup.
Ct. 1926). For a discussion of the problems involved see (1926) 40 HARV.
L. RBv. 110; (1927) 15 CALm. L. RBa. 235.
- This question is also unsettled, but it is generally held that the drawee
may not recover money paid to the presenting bona fide holder on the
theory that the drawee is bound to know the state of the drawer's account.
Nat. Bank of N. J. v. Barrall, 10 N. J. L. 757, 58 Atl. 189 (1904). Contra,:
Nat. Loan & Exch. Bank v. Lackovitch, 131 S. C. 432, 128 S. B. 10, 39 A.
L. R. 123 (1924).
The question -would arise in this manner. The. drawer, relying on his
stop-payment order and supposing the funds covered by the stopped check
are still in the bank, draws a second check, which is refused by the bank,
because of lack of funds, the drawer's account having been depleted by a
payment of the stopped check. Banks are usually held responsible in dam-
ages even where the refusal to honor a check is due to an honest mistake.
BRADY, op. cit. =pra, note 1, § 210; 2 MORSE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 45S.
'r Assuming the same fact situation as that set out in note 6, cupra, let
19301
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Such a situation very naturally has led banks to resort to stipu-
lations against responsibility for failure to obey stop-payment
orders.
Courts, generally, have recognized at least two objections to
upholding such agreements: (1) that they are against public
policy in that they would allow the bank to escape the conse-
quence of its own negligence; 8 and (2) that they lack consid-
eration.9
Public Policy. The courts first presented with this problem
avoided a square decision as to whether or not such stipulations
were void per se as against public policy by resolving the prob-
lem into one of construing the agreement, saying:
"Every presumption is against an intention to contract for
immunity for not exercising ordinary diligence in the transac-
tion of any business, and hence the general rule is that contracts
will not be so construed, unless expressed in unequivocal
terms." :o
Thus, where a bank accepted stop-payment orders stipulating
that it would "endeavor" to execute them, but would assume no
liability for failure to do so, the court felt that an "endeavor'! to
stop the check necessarily implied the exercise of ordinary care,
thus avoiding a decision as to whether or not an absolute stipu-
lation would have been declared invalid.11 But where the stipu-
us suppose that the drawer is imprisoned and prosecuted under a bad cheek
law providing that refusal by the bank to honor a check makes out a prima
facie case against the drawer. It has been held in a recent case that the
bank was responsible in damages for false imprisonment where it negli-
gently refused to honor a cheek, since its negligence was the proximate
cause of the-plaintiff's imprisonment. Mause v. Central Savings & Trust
Co., 167 N. E. 86 (Ohio 1929). Contra: Hartford v. All Night etc. Bank,
170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac. 356 (1915). The danger from this type of suit will
become greater as the bad check laws come more into use.
a When first applied this objection was supported, in part, by analogy to
cases involving common carriers. The analogy is somewhat weak since,
the common carrier being regarded as "affected with a public interest,"
entirely different considerations are involved.
0 This would seem the more valid objection since the absolute obligation
to stop payment is based upon a contract seldom expressed but always im-
plied from the usual course of banking business. 2 Mopsn, op. cit. supra note
1, § 458.
10 Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 25 Misc. 716, 718, 55 N. Y. Supp. 576,
578 (Sup. Ct. 1899), quoting from Mynard v. Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 180
(1877) (a case involving an attempt by a common carrier to avoid re,
sponsibility by stipulation).
- Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank, supra note 10. Following this process
the court construed the agreement (printed in the :assbook) in that case
as follows: (Italicized words inserted by the court-the other words con-
stitute the original agreement) "It is further agreed that the bank shall
not be responsible for the execution of an order to stop payment of a check
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lation has been couched in unequivocal terms which could not
reasonably allow of construction, the problem being thus squarely
presented, courts have divided as to the question of public
policy.'=
Finding that an unequivocal stipulation might be declared in-
valid and that an equivocal stipulation would be construed as
holding the bank to some standard of care, some banks conceived
the idea of phrasing their stipulation in such a manner as to
make it appear that the depositor requested them to stop payment
merely "as an act of courtesy." Such a stipulation has been sus-
tained, apparently by construing the request as something less
than an order to stop payment in the first instance so that no
question of stipulating against negligence was Involved.3
It has been suggested that the publi, policy objection be met
by making the enforcement of the stipulation conditional upon
the exercise of reasonable care by the bank1 ' It is submitted, how-
previously drawn; that the bank will endeavor to execute such orders, but
that no liability shall be created by failure so to do, wlwro thw bank lzas
exerciged ardiw-,y care in that egard; and that no rule, usage, or custom
shall be construed to creat4'such liability." The same process was adopted
in Appleby v. Erie County Savings Bank, 62 N. Y. 12 (1875), a case involv-
ing a stipulation in a savings bank book for release from liability for pay-
ing to the wrong person.
Such contracts were held to be against public policy in Levine v. Bank,
132 Misc 130, 229 N. Y. Supp. 108 (Mun. Ct. 1928); Hiroshima v. Bank
of Itbly, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926). In the former case the
stipulation covered "inadvertence, negligence, error, or otherwise." In the
latter case, the stop-payment was asked "as an act of courtesy" but the
court did not attempt to construe the agreement saying merely that such
contracts were against public policy. Cont a: Tremont Trust Co. v.
Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782, 9 A. L. Rt. 1067 (1920). The agree-
ment in that case was as follows:
"The Tremont Trust Co. receives the request upon the express condition
that it -ill use the best methods Imown to it to prevent oversight or ac-
cident, but that it shall not be in anyway liable for its act should said check
be paid by it in the course of its business." The court said:
"We are unable to see anything illegal or anything against public policy,
in a stipulation which relieves the bank... from the results of mere inat-
tention, carelessness, oversightedness or mistakes of its employees." Ib.
402, 126 N. E. at 783.
Substantially the same form as that set out above is approved and
adopted by Mr. Paton in working out his standard forms. 2 PATON's Dr-
GEST (1926) § 4463a.
1 'Cohen v. State Bank of Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 76, 105 At. 870 (1918).
The court said: "The'plaintiff was not required to use the form of order,
but since he chose in -writing to ask the bank to stop payment as an act
of courtesy and not av a matter of right, he cannot complain if the bank
be relieved from liability by -eason of the terms of the order which he
gave." But cf. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, supra note 12.
'4 (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 780. Such a view is also set out in BRANNAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, _§ 189. Ostensibly this is the approach of those cases
which resolve the problem into a matter of construction. Supra note 11.
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ever, that such a compromise would hardly be serviceable since
the distinction in a given instance between "negligence" and
"reasonable care," which would presumably include "inadvert-
ence" and -"accident," is apt to be so nebulous as to be imprac-
ticable of application. Though this distinction has been recog-
nized and applied,"; in practice the ultimate result would be the
nullifying of the stipulation by holding the bank, as negligent, in
nearly all instances.0 Furthermore, the infinite variations and
uncertain borderlines of the concept of negligence seem to make
undesirable its application to banking law, where certainty and
predictability probably are to be desired even at the cost of
arbitrariness.
The public policy objection may be met more directly. The
extent and limitations of the power to declare contracts void as
against sound public policy are vague and undefined, inasmuch
as they turn finally upon a weighing of possible consequences in
the light of resulting benefit or harm to the public generally.
Therefore, as was suggested regarding rules of law based upon
negligence, in the interest of certainty the doctrine should be
sparingly applied as a guide in setting up norms of conduct in
the field of commercial law. At least it should be applied only in
cases free from doubt.17
Moreover, from the standpoint of business policy the balance
may readily weigh in favor of the stipulation. Is it wise to leave
depositors free to draw checks indiscriminately, safe in the
knowledge that they may always impose upon the bank an abso-
lute duty to stop payment? Apparently, abuses of the stop-pay-
ment privilege are so frequent in some instances as to require
rather stringent measures. 8 Also the stop-payment order is an
obstruction to any effort to obtain an adjustment between the
'15 Grocott & Sherry v. African Banking Corp., 18 E. A. C. 267 (1904).
However, in this case the distinction was clearer than in the ordinary case,
since the check came through the clearings some six weeks after it had
been stopped. The court felt that payment then was not through negli-
gence but rather because of a qapse of memory" or "inadvertence" on the
part of the clerk. Consequently, the bank was released under stipula-
tion excusing "inadvertence."
10 This fact becomes rather patent when it is realized that every Amer-
ican case approaching the problem from that angle has held the bank.
27 See Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 563, 102 Pac. 956, 960 (1909):
"Before a court should declare a contract not nalum in so opposed to sound
public policy, it must be entirely satisfied that the public will be sub-
stantially benefited and that such advantage is not merely theoretical or
problematical."
is A number of states have sought to cheek such abuses by including the
issuing of checks with intent to stop payment .in their bad-check laws.
PATOx, op. cit. supra note 12, § 1260a.
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law and the most convenient and expedient business methods.0
Stopping payment of a check is the abnormal rather than the
normal function and consequently necessitates abnormal meth:
ods; namely, the close examination of every check passing
through the bank's hands to make sure that it is not the subject
of a stop-payment order.-°
On the other hand it may be objected that the interests of the
depositor are being sacrificed to too great an extent. As a prac-
tical matter, however, banks will not be encouraged to over-
laxity in dealing with stop-payment orders, for fear of offending
customers. Nor is it unreasonable to place upon the depositor
some of the burden where stop-payments are concerned since in
many cases it is only by his act in the first instance that the stop-
payment is made necessary.2' Indeed, the problem is not dis-
similar to that involved in determining who shall assume the re-
sponsibility in cases of checks so negligently drawn that they
may be easily raised. There is no little authority for saying
that the responsibility in that case should be borne by the
drawer.-
Lack of Conide*ration. Strange to say, this objection has re-
ceived less attention from the courts 2 though, from the technical
point of view, it is somewhat more decisive than is that of public
policy, inasmuch as the entire problem, though it savors of tort,
is founded in contract.2- Obviously, if the stipulation is agreed
upon when th deposit account is opened the queition of con-
2 Turner, A Factual Analysbo of Certaiu Proposed Amcndment. to tho
Negotiable Istunents Lato (1928) 38 YArx L. J. 1047.
20 3 WESTERFMID, BANKING PRINCIPLE AND PRAOTICS (1926) 551: "So
many checks are continually going astray in the mails and otherwise that
it is unsafe to pay a check more than a few hours old without looking
through the list of stop-payments. Stop orders are, therefore, very annoy-
ing, and a systematic watch for such items is required. Stop-payment
cards are prepared and distributed to tellers and bookkeepers affected;
... in large institutions the volume of this work has necessitated the crea-
tion of a specialized department."
21 Factually considered, the depositor, by his own act, places in circula-
tion an order to pay money, which it is the primary obligation of the bank
to recognize. Then, having changed his mind, capriciously or otherwise,
he asks the bank, for his own benefit, to undo a situation which he himself
has created, and thereby places an unusual burden upon the bank.
22
"Where -a drawer of a check has prepared hi§ check so negligently that
it can easily be altered without giving the instruinent a suspicious appear-
ance and alterations are afterwards made, he can blaMe no one but him-
self, and he cannot hold the bank for the consequences of his own negli-
gence." MoRso, op. cit. =pre note 1, § 480; 2 DAwImE, NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS (6th ed. 1913) § 1659.
23The question has been considered in only two cases: Levine v. Bank;
Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, both supra. note 12.
241 upra note 9.
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sideration can not arise, for, in that case, the consideration for
the whole transaction is consideration for the release of the
Bank. But where the stipulation against negligence is de-
manded subsequently, the contention of lack of consideration is
hardly rebuttable if there is adherence to orthodox contract
rules.26 But, once the depositor has adopted the stipulation there
would apparently be no objection to placing the transaction in
that general category of promises which courts, whether cor-
rectly or not, looselyj terim "waiver." 27
The recent case of Gaits v. Windsor Bank, 2 construing an un-
equivocal waiver provision, will undoubtedly have a far-reaching
effect upon this problem.20 Here the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in a brief opinion, upheld the stipulation relieving the bank
from responsibility without any reference to the objections dis-
cussed above, though both were advanced by counsel 0 The
court, relying solely upon the dogma "freedom of contract," con-
tented itself with saying: -
"If a drawer wishes to hold a bank to its common-law liability
and impose upon it the absolute duty of stopping payment of
a check, the notice served on the bank should be positive and un-
qualified. Then if the bank does not desire to assume the liability
25 In view of this fact it has been suggested that the agreement appear
on the signature card and be signed by the depositor when the account is
opened. PATON, loc. cit4 supr. note 12.
26 "The bank has no right to exact a release for itself for all forms of
negligence as a condition precedent to its acceptance of such stop orders
because it was an act it was already legally bound to perform." See
Levine v. Bank, supra note 12, at 131, 229 N. Y. Supp. at 109. A promise
to perform an act one is already bound to perform upon demand is not good
consideration. 1 WYLIASToN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 130.
27 The problem is somewhat analogous to a waiver of notice of dishonor
or of the statute of limitations, no consideration being required in those
instances for "nothing could well have a more fraudulent operation than
to allow one who is bound by a conditional promise to indicate by word or
acts while performance is possible that non-performance [of the condition]
will not affect his own action under the contract, and, subsequently, 'When
in reliance on this statement, the promisee has failed to perform the con-
dition, and the time is passed when it is possible to do so, to set up tho
failure as an excuse for non-performance." 1 WILisTON, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 139; 2 *b1. §§ 679, 689. It may perh4ps be doubted that the
stop-payment case comes within this reasoning as it is bard to see that
the bank is lulled into inactivity.
28 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929) ; (1929) 29 COL. I. REV. 1150. The
stipulation used by* the bank in this case was substantially the same as
that used by the bank in the Tremont case, supra note 12.
20 This is especially true since in the light of previous New York de-
cisions [Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank, supra note 10, and Levine v. Bank,
supra note 12] the feeling has been that New York banks could not avail
themselves of release by stipulation. PATON, lo. cit. supra note 12.
30 See brief of respondent.
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imposed by such a notice it may cancel the account and terminate
its relation with the depositor."
The court found support for its position by drawing analogies
from the field of bank collections where banks have been allowed
to contract themselves out of their common law responsibilities.
Stipulations purportine to release banks from responsibility for
accepting anything other than cash in payment of a check, which
at common law was deemed to be negligence, have been upheld.-
In both cases the pro.vision might be regarded, not as a stipula-
tion against "negligence," but as an agreement defining the
standard of conduct to be employed. Certainly the standard set
up by the courts in the absence of stipulation need not be the
final one.
Whether or not the Goite case reaches an entirely equitable
adjustment of the problem, 3 which may be doubted, there seems
little technical reason to question the decision. If the highly
unfavorable position in which ban-ks that have paid stopped items
by mistake are placed has contributed, as a practical matter, to
the use of stipulations against all responsibility, it would seem
the direct remedy would be to make an adjustment of the law
relating to that unfavorable position so as to relieve the bank
from the risks growing out of purely technical legal difficulties.
3.' It is a little difficult to understand how, the order having been tendered,
the- bank could justly sever relations with its depositor insofar, at least,
as the particular check in question was concerned. Although the bank
could probably close the account at any time, a proposition as to wvhich
there is little direct authority, it is e.xtremely doubtful that it could with-
hold repayment of the amount of the stopped check to guard against inad-
vertence.32 Fergus County v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 15 Mont. 582,
244 Pac. 883 (1926); (1927) 27 COL. L. Bsv. 294. In dealing with this
problem the courts have again avoided square decisions on the merits by
resolving the question into one of construction. Cf. Isler v. National Park
Bank, 239 N. Y. 462, 147 N. E. 66 (1925).
33 As to the question of -whether or not there is any basis for distinguish-
ing between relief from financial loss and relief from damages for slander
of credit or false imprisonment, it would seem that so long as the form
of loss can be construed as included within the stipulation, the above dis-
cussion may apply as well to one as to the other. The only decided case
in point upheld a stipulation purporting to absolve the bank from re-
sponsibility for slander of credit. Cohen v. State :Bank of Philadelphia,
su=prs not6 13. Though there are no decided cases on the question of false
imprisonment, it could very plausibly be regarded as an aggravated form
of slander of credit.
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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES DUE TO DEFECTIVE
HIGHWAYS
It has long been accepted as a principle of American lair that,
except by the consent of the legislature, a state,' or a local
government acting as an agency of the state in the execution
of a governmental function,2 is not responsible at the suit of
an individual for the torts of its officers or agents committed
in the performance of their duties. Although the injustice of
a rule that places the risk of injury wvhol]k upon the individual
has been greatly accentuated by the widened scope of govern-
ment activities, th6 legislature of no state has yet been villing
to consider the entire problem of how far this risk should be
assumed by the public. One field, however, in which considerable
progress has been made toward a different rule of public re-
sponsibility is that of governmental liability for injuries due to
defective highways.
-Although it has always been considered the province of the
state to provide adequate public roads, the usual practice until
the advent of the automobile was to delegate the performance
of this function almost entirely to the local governments.3
Statutes have made it their duty to construct and mailitain
highways.' But are these local governments to be responsible
to an individual for injuries occasioned by a breach of this duty
of maintenance? In respect to cities and incorporated villages 1
the question seems to be settled. The courts of a majority of
states hold cities responsible for negligence in the care of their
streets.8 Twelve state courts have taken the contrary view that
. Lewis v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 (1884); Ketterer v. State Board, 181-
Ky. 287, 115 S. W. 200 (1909); Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 74 N.
W. 111 (1898); see WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT (1927).;'
Maguire, State Liability for Tort (1916) 30 HAne. L. Rsv. 20; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort (1924-28) 34 YALE L. 3. 1, 129, 229, 36 ibid.
1, 757, 1039, 28 CoL. L. RBv. 557, 734; Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 64; Note
ANN. CAS. 1913E 1038.2 Lefrois v. Monroe County, 162 N. Y. 563, 57 N. E. 185 '(1900);
Claussen v. Luverne, 103 Minn. 491, 115 N. W. 643 (1908); see Rhobidas
v. Concord, 70 N. H. 90, 107, 47 At]. 82, 83 (1900); DMLON, MUNIoIPAL
COuPORATioNS (5th ed. 1911) §§ 1625, 1626, 1638 et seq.; McQuILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs (2d ed. 1928) §§ 2772-2775, 2792 et seq.; Note
(1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. s.) 147; (1923)- 32 YALE L. J. 410.
3 See Markey v. County of Queens, 154 N. Y. 675, 683. 49 N. E. 71,
73 (1898).
4 See, for example, IND. ANN. STAT, (Burns, 1894) c. 76, arts. 1 and
2; PA. STAT. (West, 1920). § 6527.
5 When used hereafter the term "city" is intended to include incorporated
villages as well.
0 Indianapolis v. Doherty, 71 Ind. 5 (1880) ; Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs,
104 N. Y. 459, 11 N. E. 43 (1887); Smith v. New Orleans, 135 La. 980,
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street maintenance is purely a governmental function for negli-
gence in the performance of which a city is not responsible,7
but statutes in all except three of these states now bring them
into accord with the majority rule.
Towns, counties, and other so-called quasi-municipal corpora-
tions, on the other hand, present a different problem. Since
the case of Mower v. Inlzabitants of Leicester 0 in 1812, nearly
all courts have held that in the maintenance of highways
towns and counties act as agencies of the state in the execution
of a governmental function, and as such are under no responsi-
bility, iv the absence of a statute to the contrary, for damages
66 So. 319 1(1914); Hanrahan v. Chicago, 289 Ill. 400, 124 N. E. 547
(1919); Lawrence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215, 130 At]. 428 (1925).
7 Fort Smith v. York, 52 Ark. 84, 12 S. W. 157 (1889); Arnold v.
San Jose, 81 Cal. 618, 22 Pac. 877 (1889); Ricecio v. Plainville, 106 Conn.
61, 136 At. 872 (1927); Lynch v. Detroit, 101 Mich. 43, 59 N. W. 443
(1894); Carter v. Rahway, 57 N. J. L. 196, 30 At]. 863 (1894); Young
v. Charleston,, 20 S. C. 116 (1880); Latulipe v. Burlington, 93 Vt. 434,
108 AtL 425 (1919); Morrison v. Eau Claire, 115 Wis. 538, 92 N. W.
280 (1902); see Huntington v. Calais, 105 Me. 144, 145, 73 At. 829,
830 '(1909); Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 354 (1877); Hickey v. Berlin,
78 N. H. 69, 69, 96 At]. 295, 295 (1915); Taylor v. Peckam, 8 R. TL 349,
352 (1866).
Since in New England the town partakes of so many of the characteris-
tics of a city, a change from the one form of organization to the other
has seemed to the courts of those six states to offer insufficient reason
for making an exception to the established rule of non-liability for
defective highways. See Hill v. Boston, supro, at 354.
8 CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1923) art. 5619, § 2; CoNN. Gvni. STAT.
(1918) § 1414; Ms. REv. STzT. (1916) c. 24, § 92; MAss. GEu. LAws
(1921) c. 84, § 15; MIcH. Comp. LAws (Cahill, 1915) c. 86, §§ 4584, 4585;
N. H. Pus. LAws (1926) a. 82, §§ 8, 9; R. I GmD. LAws Y(1923) § 667;
S. C. CODE op LUws (1922) § 4478; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 81.14.
Arkansas and Vermont impose no responsibility for defective streets
upon cities either by common law or by statute. Although New Jersey
likewise imposes no responsibility for failure to repair streets, responsibility
has been imposed for active negligent misconduct as distinguished from
mere omission. Symons v. Freeholders of Warren, 38 N. 3. L. 3. 53 (1915)
(recovery allowed where plaintiff injured by falling over heavy timbers
negligently left across culvert by defendant). The same distinction is
drawn- in England. See infra, note 10. There seems to be no utility to
such a distinction.
9 9 Mass. 247 (1812). The court relied upon the authority of Russell
v. Men of Devon, 16 East. 305 -(1788), -where recovery against the county
for damages caused by a defective bridge was not allowed because there
was no corporate fund from which judgment could be paid. The Massa-
chusetts town, on the other band, bad a corporate character and a suf-
ficient corporate fund. The decision may more correctly be based upon
the authority of Bro. Abr., "Accion sur Ie Case," pl. 92, that an action
on the case by an individual against a county 'would not lie for a failure
to perform a public duty since the proper remedy was an indictment.
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arising frbm an unsafe condition of their roads.10 Only Mary-
AD Wood v. Tipton County, 7 Bax. 112 (Tenn. 1874).; Thompson-Caldwell
Const. Co. v. Young, 294 Fed. 145 (C. C, A. 4th, 1925). Some typical
reasons given for the rule are:
"The duties enjoined upon [a town] by law are enjoined upon it as
part of the government; they are therefore public in nature, that is to
say they are duties to the state and not to private persons. Hence a
breach of one of them creates a liability to the state only, on account
of which an offending town may be amenable to a public action by in-
dictment." Weltsch v. Town of Stark, 65 Minn. 5, 8, 67 N. W. 648, 648
(1896).
"Having regard to the fact that counties were created for the better
and more convenient government of the state, in the exercise of those
political powers which appertain to local government and which are for
the public benefit, they should be no more liable for damages resulting
therefrom, at the suit of a private individual, than the state itself."
Markey v. County of Queens, supra note 3, at. 682, 49 N. E. at 78.
"Since a county is but a political subdivision of the state, a suit
against the county is in effect a suit against the state." McDermott V.
County of -Delaware, 60 Ind. App. 209, 213, 110 N. B. 237, 239 (1915).
See also DILLON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1688; MCQuIL.IN, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 2900; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STnEETs (4th ed. 1926) § 788.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by the courts in attempting
to explain why, for breach of the same duty of highway maintenance,
cities are held responsible while towns and counties are not. DILLoN, op.
cit. supra note 2, § 1689; McQuiLLIN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2902. Some
courts find sufficient distinction in the fact that cities and villages are
units voluntarily formed for the special benefit of the inhabitants, while
towns and counties are involuntary political divisions for the more con-
venient government of the state. See Heigel v. Wichita Co., 84 Tex.
392, 394, 19 S. W. 562, 562 (1892)'. Others rationalize the rule by calling
care of streets a proprietary function. See Hines v, Lockport, 50 N. Y.
236, 238 (1872); Bessemer v. Whaley, 187 Ala. 525, 527, 65 So. 542
(1914). But many merely recognize municipal responsibility for defective
streets as an anomalous exception to the general rule of non-responsibility
for negligence in the performance of a governmental function. Seo
Ackeret v. Minneapolis, 129 Minn. 190, 194, 151 N. W. 976, 977 (1915);
Taylor v. Spokane, 91 Wash. 629, 634, 158 Pac. 478, 480 (1916). A more
satisfactory explanation may perhaps be the need for safer roads and
the practicability of closer supervision in a limited area of concentrated
population. See DmLON, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 1714-1716; ELLIOTT,
op. cit. supra § 534.
In England local governments charged with the maintenance of high-
ways are not responsible for defects due to the nonfeasance of their
officers. Gibson v. Mayor of Preston, L. R. 5 Q. B. 218 (1870). But
such governments are answerable to an individual for defects created
by their misfeasance. Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B.
214 (1871) (pile of stones left lying by the authorities at the edge of the
road, unguarded and unlighted).
The tendency of the English courts to give "misfeasance" a very
liberal construction has made serious inroads into the immunity of local
authorities. Cf. McClelland v. Manchester, [1912] 1 X. B. 118 (defendant
left unfenced the end of a newly opened dead end street which ran into
a ravine); Thompson v. Bradford, [1915] 3 X. B. 13 (hole left by tele-
graph pole removed by defendant improperly filled); see Note (1918)
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land and Pennsylvania, recognizing the weakness of the prece-
dent upon which the Mlower case relies, hold the town and county
responsible without express statutory provision. Thus, except
in these two states, explicit legislation is necessary to impose
responsibility upon quasi-municipal corporations. Massachu-
setts :2 in 1648 and Connecticut ' in 1672 were the first states
to pass such statutes, while at present counties in fifteen states 14
62 SOL. J. 600. There appear to be no statutes -which change the common
law rule of responsibility. See PiSATT AND YACxENZM, LAW OF HIGH-
wAYs (17th ed. 1923) 121-124, 463, n. 6.
a'Anne Arundel County v. Duckett, 2G Md. 468 (1864); Richardson v.
Kent County, 120 Md. 153, 87 AtL 747 (1913); Dean v. New Milford, 5 W.
& S. 545 (Pa. 1843); McCormick v. Allegheny County, 263 Pa. 146, 106
AtI. 203 (1919). In Iowa, counties are responsible for defective bridges
under their care. Cooper v. Mils County, 69 Iowa 350, 28 N. W. 633
(1886). But the rule as to bridges is not extended to cover defective
highways. Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa 81, 152 N. W. 12
(1915). American courts as a rule make no attempt to distinguish
between non-feasance and misfeasance as do British courts. Arnold v.
San Iose, supro, note 7; see Weltsch v. Town of Stark, supra note 10, at
648. But of. Hart v. County of Union, 57 N. T. L. 90, 29 AtL 490 (1894);
Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Green, 135 Ky. 685, 123 S. W. 264 (1909);
Chandler v. Davidson County; 142 Tenn. 265, 218 S. W. 222 (1920).
But see sunpra note 8.
= "Bridges-The court considering the great danger that persons, horseq,
teames, are exposed to by reason of defective bridges and country high-
-ways in this jurisdiction, Doth Order and Declare: That if any person
at any time loose his life, in passing such bridge or highway
. 
after due
warning given unto any of the Selectmen of the towne in thich such defect
is, in wriiing under the hand of two witnesses or upon preaentment to
the shire Cour% of such defective 'wayes or bridges, that then the County
or towne -which ought to secure such -wayes or bridges, shall pay a fine
of one hundred pounds, to the parents, husband, wife or children or next
of kin to the partie deceased. And if any such person loose a limb,
break a bone or receive any other bruise, or breach in any part of his
body, through such defect as aforesaid, the County or towne, through
whose neglect such hurt is done shall pay to the partie so hurt, double
damages, the like satisfaction shall be made for any teame, Cart or
Cartage, horse, other beast or loading, proportionable to the damage sus-
tained aforesaid." Iws AMI LmETnanS OF MASS. (1660); see CoLomAL
LAws or AMss. 1660-1672 (1890) 126, intro. 80 et seq.
23 GENLTAL LAWs Arm LmEna s or CoNN. (1672) tit. 9Bridges."
'4 CAL. GENr. LAws ,(Deering, 1923) act. 5619, § 2; KAN. RsV. STAT.
ANN. (1923) c. 68, § 301; M& Ruv. STAT. (1916) c. 24, § 92; M s. GEN.
LAWS (1921) c. 84, § 15; MiCH. Comr. LAWS (Cahill, 1915). § 4367; NWE.
Comn. STAT. (1922) § 2746, as amended by Laws 1929, c. 171; N. H.
PuB. LAws (1926) c. 81, § 1; N. Y. CoNs. LAwrs (CahfI,, 1923) c. 11,
§ 6; OHo Gnx. CoD. (Page, 1926) § 2408; ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920)
§ 4701; S. C. Cons or LAWS (1922) § 2948; S. D. REv. CoDn (1919) §.
8590; W. V.A. CODE ANx. (Barnes, 1923) c. 43, § 167; Wis. STAT. (1927)
§ 81.15.
WAmS. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 951, providing that a suit.
may be maintained against a county or town for an injury to the rights
of an individual arising from some act or omission of such county or-
19301
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and towns in the same number 11 are thus made responsible.
Although the provisions of such statutes widely vary, the
responsibility which they place upon towns and counties is
commonly not so comprehensive as that which the common law
places upon individuals. Thus, some statutes provide that re-
covery shall be conditional upon certain officials having had
actual knowledge of the defect prior to the accident,", or upon
the filing within what seems an unreasonably limited time of
notice of the injury and a claim for damages, 1 or of -the com-
plaint instituting suit.18 In several states a quite inadequate
sum is set as the limit of damages recoverable0 Moreover,
since the statutes are considered as being in derogation of the
town, is held to impose responsibility for defective highways. Kirtloy
v. County of Spokane, 20 Wash. 111, 54 Pac. 936 (1898). Counties in
Georgia and New Jersey are by statute made liable for defective bridges
only. GA. LAWS (1926) § 748.; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (1910) § 66a20, p.
4451.
-' CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 1414; KmN. RmV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c.
68, § 301; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 24, § 92; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921)
c. 84, § 15; MICH. Coup. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §§ 4584, 4585; N. H.,PuB.
LAws (1926) c. 82, § 9; ibid. c. 89, § 1; N. J. Comp. STAT. (1910) §
66a19, p. 4451; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS .(Cahill, 1923) c. 27, § 74; OHio GEN.
CoDo (Page, 1926) § 3298-17; R. L GEN. LAWS (1923). § 667; S. C. CoDn
or LAWS (1922) § 4478; S. ). REV. CODE (1919) § 8590; W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 43, § 167; WIS. STAT. (1927) § 81.16; WAsH.
CoMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 951 [see note 14, suprz; Orrock Y.
South Moran, 97 Wash. 144, 165 Pac. 1096 (1917)]. Towns in Vermont
are by statute made responsible only for defective bridges and culverts.
VT. GEN. LAWs '(1917) § 4615.
LO0XAN. Rmv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 68, § 301 (5 days); N. H. Pun. LAWS
(1926) c. 821 §§ 8, 9 (24 hours); ME. Rav. STAr. (1916) c. 24, § 92
(same). Also under the Maine statute if the plaintiff had notice of the
defect prior to the time of injury and failed to notify the authorities
of such defect, he cannot recover.
17 ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 24, § 92 (14 days); N. H. PUB. LAWs (1926)
c. 89, § 9 (10 days); Wis. STAT. (1927) § 81.14 (30 days). Other states
allow a longer period. MAsS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 84, § 18 (30 days,
unless incapacitated by injury for a longer period); N. Y. CoNs. LIVS
(Cahill, 1923) c. 11, § 6 (3 months); R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 608
(60 days). It is the general practice to make filing of notice of the
accident a condition precedent to the responsibility of cities. See MCQuIL-
LiN, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2886-2899.
18 NEB. COMP. STAT. (1922) § 2746 (30 days); N. H. PUs. LAws (1926)
c. 89, § 9 (30 days after filing claim). Other states have more reasonable
provisions. ME. Rv. STAT. (1916) c. 24, § 92 (1 year); MASS. GsN.
LAwS (1921) c. 84, § 18 (2 years); N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c.
27, § 74 (6 months).
I'D MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 84, § 15 (no more than $4000 for in-
juries to person or property); ibid. c. 229, § 1 (no more than $1000 for
death); ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 4701 ($2000); Vt. Laws 1921, no.
128 ($3000); Wis. STAT. (1927) § 81.15 ($5000).
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common law, they are as a rule strictly construed and narrowly
applied,20 although a few courts appear to have adopted a more
liberal rule of construction.2'
The courts of many states have taken the attitude that
these statutes are intended to impose upon towns and counties
a responsibility for negligence, and that hence, except where
express provision is made, the rules of common law negligence
are applicable.- Connecticut and Maine, on the other hand, have
adopted the view that the statutes are penal, actions under them
being for the recovery of a penalty for the violation of a public
duty. 3 But since under either theory the courts demand only
the same duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of high-
ways, 24 the distinction is normally of little importance.2 In
Oregon and West Virginia statutes which seem to be essentially
no different from statutes 20 in several states which hold towns
and counties accountable only for negligence are interpreted
as imposing an absolute responsibility for failure to keep the
highways reasonably safe for travel, and the courts declare it
to be immaterial whether or not the local authorities were
negligently responsible for the existence of the defects.2  The
application of the principle of responsibility without fault seems
to be a desirabIe solution of the problem, but one which in the
face of the present reluctance to recognize any responsibility
is not likely to be widely, adopted for some time.
2 0 See Franklin County v. Dorst, 96 Ohio St. 163, 166, 117 N. E. 166,
167 (1917); ELioT, op. cit. supra note 10, § 536.
21 Infr'a, note 27.
22 Boos v. Nortbfield, 186 Mich. 386, 152 N. W. 1042 (1915); see
Kinnie v. Morristown, 184 App. Div. 408, 409, 172 N. Y. Supp. 21, 22 (3d
Dep't 1918); Morris v. Langley Mills, 121 S. C. 200, 203, 113 S. E. 632,
634 (1920); Cain v. Meade County, 223 N. W. 734, 735 (S. D. 1929).2 3 See Bartram v. Sharon, 71 Conn. 686, 692, 43 At]. 143, 145 (1899);
Coburn v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 654, 657, 81 Atl. 241, 241 (191);
Moulton v. Sanford, 51 Me. 127, 129 (1862); cf. Reed v. Nortflield, 30
Mass. 94 (1832).
24 Scofield v. Poughkeepsie, 122 App. Div. 868, 107 N. Y. Supp. 767
(2d Dep'ft 1907) ; Ritter v. Shelton, 105 Conn. 447, 135 At!. 535 (1927).
25 To charge the jury as though the action were one for negligence
may not be reversible error. Frechette v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 85, 132
Atl. 467 (1926); Keating v. New London, 104 Conn. 528, 133 Atl. 586
(1926). But cf. Gustafson v. Meriden, 103 Conn. 598, 131 At!. 437
(1925). Since the statute is penal, it will not be extended '%eyond the
plain meaning of the words", therefore the defect must be the sole
proximate cause of the injury. Bartram v. Sharon; Moulton v. San-
ford, both supre note 23; cf. Clinton v. Revere, 195 Mass. 151, I4, 80
N. E. 813, 813 (1907)1
26 Supra notes 14 and 15.
27Bailey v. Benton County, 61 Ore. 390, 122-Pac. 755 (1912); Shipley
v. Jefferson County, 72 W. Va. 656, 78 S. E. 792 (1913); Williams v.
Main Island Creek Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 464, 98 S. . 511 (1919) (rule
1930o
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When the states began to take over a share of the highway
maintenance which had hitherto been exercised by the lqcal
governments, legislatures were confronted with* the question
of possible state responsibility for defective highways. Recourse
against the local government was cut off when a road was
taken from its control,28 and, in the absence of a statute ex-
pressly accepting responsibility, recourse against the state was
barred by the rule of non-responsibility of the state for the torts
of its officers.29 Thus here, as in the case of towns and counties,
responsibility must be created by legislative enactment. It has
scarcely been doubted that in most states the legislature has the
power to accept for the state responsibility for the torts of its
officers,30 yet so impressed are the courts with the sacredness'
of the traditional freedom from responsibility that only the most
explicit language will be recognized as waiving its protection.
Cbnsequently, it has been quite uniformly held that a statute
permitting courts to hear all claims which individuals may have
against the state,3' even when claims "for negligence" or "ex
delicto" are specifically included,32 is as to tort claims only a
provision for adjudication of the validity of such claims and
not a waiver of immunity from responsibility. But, although
no state has yet accepted a general responsibility in clear enough
terms to be recognized by its- courts, there are now seven which
have assumed responsibility for injuries arising out of defects in
hIghways under their control. MassachusettS.3 3 in 1893 was the
of absolute responsibility held to apply even when an obstruction was
placed in the road by a third party).
2sPooler v. Burton, 40 R. I. 249, 100 At]. 465 (1917); Murphy v.
Norfolk, 94 Conn. 592, 110 At]. 62 (1920); Cain v. Meade Countyi, supra
note 22. But of. Maynard v. Westfield, 87 Vt. 532, 90 At]. 504 (1914).
29 State v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 95 At]. 956 (1915).; Longstreet v. Mecosta
County, 228 Mich. 542, 200 N. W. 248 (1924).
SO In twenty states suits against the state are constitutionally authorized.
In only four are suits constitutionally prohibited. ALA. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 14; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20; ILL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 26; W. VA. CONST.
art. VI, § 35. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 84
YALE L. J. 1, 12, nn. 38, 39.
SI.Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 24 N.
E. 854 (1890); Smith v. State, 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N: B. 841 (1920);
see Note Ann. Gas. 1913E 1041; Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1271. Similar
statutes are given a more liberal interpretation by British courts. Par-
nell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas. 643 (1887); Atty. Gen. v. Wemyss, 13
App. Cas. 192 (1888).
32 Denning v. State, 128 Cal. 316, 55' Pac. 1000 (1899); State v. Sharp,
21 Ariz. 424, 189 Pac. 631 (1920). Even though the suit on a tort claim
may have been specially authorized by the legislature, this may never-
theless create no duty in the state. Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 565,
152'N. W. 144 (1915). Contra: Sandell v. State, 115 S. C. 168, 104 S. E.
567, 119 S. E. 776 )(1922); (1924). 33 YM L. . 432.
3 Mass. Acts 1893, e. 476, § 13,
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first to enact the necessary legislation and has been followed by
New York (1910),"1 Maine (1913), -3 Connecticut (1915),33
Michigan (1925), 37 South Carolina (1925), and Kansas
(1929) 39 Georgia, also, has apparently accepted responsibility
for defective bridges.0 All of these states had previously made
towns and counties responsible and, in general, the intention
of the statutes seems to be to impose the same responsibility
upon the state. The South Carolina provision is that "for any
injury... through a defect... of any road... under the con-
trol of the State Highway Departnent, the county shall not be
liable and the damages hereinabove provided for Las recoverable
against the county] shall be recovered in a suit against the
State Highway Commission." 41 In Maine, where towns and
counties share the maintenance of state and state aid high-
ways4 2 the statute provides that the state shall be responsible
to such towns and counties for any judgment recovered against
them for defects in state and state aid highways 3 The statutes
of Massachusetts,4 - Kansas,45 and Connecticut " are expressed '
in almost the same terms as those relating to local responsibility.
On the other hand, the New York statute merely provides that
"the state shall not be liable for damages suffered by any person
from defects in state and county highways except... on such
as are maintained by the state."4 -7 Most of the statutes place
no narrower limits upon state than upon local responsibility,
although there has been a tendency in a few states to do so.
Thus the original broad Massachusetts provision 8 has been
3 N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 570.
35 Me. Laws 1913, c. 130, § 27.
3 Conn. Pub. Acts 1915, c. 307.
27Mich. Acts 1925, no. 374, p. 736.
28 S. C. Laws 1925, no. 189, § 1.
39 Kan. Laws 1929, c. 225, § 23.
40 The State Highway Department of Georgia is made responsible 'Tor
all damages awarded against any county under eisting laws whenever
the cause of action originates on highways jurisdiction over which has
been assumed by said State Highway Department Ga. Laws 1926,
§ 328 (19). See supra note 14.
41-Supra note 38.
42 Mn. REv. STAT. (1916) C. 25, §§ 8, 17.
3fIN& § 29.
44 AS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 81, § 18; Acts 1923, c. 230.45Supra note 39.
4 Conn. Pub. Acts 1925, c. 263, § 47.
47N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 27, § 176.
The Michigan statute is unique in that it provides not for a court action
but for the presentation of a claim to the state administration board
which is empowered to direct the payment of -whatever sum the board
determines to be just compensation. Supra note 37.
-s 'The Commonwealth shall be liable for injuries to persons or property
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amended to deny the responsibility of the state for want of a
fence,40 or for a defective sidewalk,50 or for such accidents as
occur during the construction or repair of a highway." More-
over, the present Massachusetts. statute seems to include -within
its terms only "injuries to persons." Since an amendment in,
1922r2 the State of New York has been responsible only for
injuries sustained between May first and November fifteenth.
In South Carolina the state, is not responsible above $1500 for
damages to property and $4000 for personal injuries, although
recovery against counties remains, as it was originally against
the state, unlimited.
Only in New York and Connecticut have the statutes received
judicial interpretation and in both states the intention of the
legislature is held to have been to place the state under the
same responsibility as local governments." Consequently, the
same rules are applied to each. Consistent with their view of
the nature of loca responsibility, the New York courts regard
an action under the statute relating to the state as one for
negligence,s while the courts of Connecticut call it an action
to recover a penalty for violation of a statutory duty.10 It
may be expected that, as cases arise under similar legislation,
the courts of other states will likewise recognize the similarity
of the problems of state and local responsibility for defective
highways. If statutes are enacted in those states which impose
responsibility without fault upon the local governments, it will
be interesting to see whether the state will accept the same
absolute responsibility." However that may be, a more wide-
spread acceptance by the states of a responsibility more nearly
occurring through a defect, or want of repair or of sufficient railing, in
or upon a state highway." Supra note 33.49 ass. Acts 1917, c. 344, pt. 1, § 16.
so Mass. Acts 1896, c. 345, § 1.
5 Mass. Acts 1900, c. 253, § 2; Acts 1917, c. 344, pt. 1, § 16. Lemon
v. Commonwealth, 236 Mass. 599, 129 N. E. 382 (1921).
52N . Y. Laws 1922, c. 371.
53 S. C. Laws 1928, no. 1055, § 1.
54 Perrotti v. Bennett, 94 Conn. 533, 109 Atl. 890 (1920); Horton v.
MacDonald, 105 Conn. 356, 135 Atl. 442 (1926); Dunn v. MacDonald,'147
Atl. 26 (Conn. 1929); Best v. State, 203 App. Div. 389, 197 N. Y. Supp.
69 (3d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 662, 142 N. E. 325 (1923); Wolf v.
State, 122 Misc. 381, 202 Nq Y. Supp. 754 *(Ct. Cl. 1024).
55 White v. State, 113 Misc. 585, 185 N. Y. Supp. 237 (Ct. C1. 1920);
Belair v. State, 212 App. Div. 206, 208 N. Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dep't 1025),
aff'd, 241 N. Y. 556, 150 N. E. 551 (1925).
56See Dunn v. MacDonald, supra note 54, at 28.
57Not only are continental countries generally far more liberal than
the American states in accepting responsibility for torts, but Franco
now to a certain degree h4s adopted the principle of responsibility with-
out fault. See WATxIS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 165-169, 202-204.
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coextensive with that now borne by individuals would go far
toward correcting a long standing injustice. 8
CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO WHAT DEBTS ARE BARRED BY A
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
The problem of the effect of a discharge in, bankruptcy as af-
fected by the rules of the conflict of laws necessitates a consid-
eration of: (1) what debts are within the purview of a discharge
under a federal bankruptcy act so as to bar subsequent suit-by
foreign creditors in the courts of this country; and (2) what
debts due local creditors will be held barred by a foreign bank-
ruptcy discharge so as to preclude subsequent suit by a local
creditor in the local courts. With regard to the first problem,
it may be desirable to discuss separately cases decided under
federal acts prior to 1898, and, in the light of such discussion
and of decisions since the adoption of the act now in force, to
endeavor to predicate what the situation at the present time may
be said to be. With regard to the second problem, such a division
is neither necessary nor desirable as the nature of the act in
force is comparatively immaterial here.
The effect of an assignment in insolvency or discharge in bank-
ruptcy in one country upon property of the debtor in another,
and the right of the assignee or trustee to sue therefor, as well
as the effect of a discharge in the United States on the right of* a
foreign creditor to pursue remedies afforded by a foreign country
upon contracts of that country are beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion, and will not be considered except insofar as they may be
related to one or other of the problems here involved. It has
also been thought desirable to confine the discussion to cases
where the problem has been raised internationally, and to exclude
any consideration of decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States and of the various state courts touching the effect
of discharges under state bankrupt and insolvent laws. The
reasons for this exclusion are twofold: (1) The decisions under
the state insolvency statutes are too colored by constitutional
issues and other factors to raise clearly and determine authorita-
tively conflict of laws questions? (2) Since, under the Act of
58 WA :xNs, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 204-207.
1Discussions of the effect of discharges under state insolvency statutes
will be found in WHAToN, CONFLIT op LAws (3d ed. 1905) §§ 522-529a;
MIINOR, CoxNcT OF LAWS (1901) § 191; LORENZEN, CASFs ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS (2d ed. 1924). 382n; Corliss, Didch'rge Under State Insolvency Law
(1884) 29 ALAtNY L. J. 186; Bailey, A Dischargc in Insolvency and ite
Effect Upon Nonresidknts (1893) 6 HARV. L. REv. 349-368, where the de-
cisions are all collected and listed by states.
2"In many respects the principles applicable to such questions (inter-
1930]
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1898, the conflict of laws questions raised by a discharge in bank-
ruptey can only arise internationally, the early inter-state de-
cisions, though of historical interest, are of doubtful significance
in an attempt to determine the prevalent view under the present
Act.
I. EFFECT OF A LOCAL DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY ON DEBTS DUE
FOREIGN CREDITORS
A. Under Federal Bankruptcy Acts Preidous to 189B
It is frequently reiterated in the cases as a broad proposition
that "a discharge from the contract according to the law of the
place where it is made, or where it is to be performed, is good
everywhere, and extinguishes the contract." 3 But it is some-
what difficult to determine from the available cases the exact ex-
tent of such a sweeping principle.
Some attempt has been made to limit the effectiveness of a dis-
charge as against foreign creditors to such creditors only as "are
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." '
state) might be supposed to apply also to general bankrupt laws of another
country. But the doctrines of those decisions are by no means uniform;
and the same State -has not invariably at different times held the same
opinions. In some of the cases, questions touching remedies rather than
rights were presented. In others, the power of the States to pass such laws
under the restrictioris of the federal constitution were examined. rudgq
Story, in his Conflict of the Law of Nations, reviews those opinions without
the attempt to reconcile them all; and in section 341, remarks, 'under the
peculiar structure of the constitution of the United States, prohibiting
States from passing laws impairing the obligations of contracts, it has
been decided that a discharge under the insolvent laws of a State, whore
the contract was made, will not operate as the discharge of any contract
excepting such as are made between the citizens of the same State. It can-
not, therefore, discharge a contract made with a citizen of another State.
But this doctrine is wholly inapplicable to contracts and discharges in for-
eign countries, which must therefore be decided upon principles of inter-
national law.' Very v. McHenry, 29 Me. 206, 214 .(1848).
Similar disavowals of the applicability of decisions under state insolvency
statutes to the international aspect of the problem are to be found in Oly-
phant v. Atwood, 17 N. Y. Super. Ct. 459 (1859); May v. Breed, 61 Mass.
15 (1851), with which compare language in Phelps v. Borland, 103 N. Y.
406, 9 N. E. 307 (1886).
3The proposition is apparently traceable to STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws
(8th ed. 1883) § 335:
"By some judges the doctrine has been put upon the implied consent of
the parties in making the contract, that they would be governed as to all
its effects by the lex loci contractus. By others it has been put upon the
more firm and solid basis of the sovereign operation of the local law, upon
all contracts made within its sovereignty; and the indispensable comity
which all other nations are accustomed to exercise towards such laws when-
ever they are brought into question, either as to contracts, or to rights, or
to property."
4 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT No. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 398. The
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It has likewise been contended that a foreign discharge should
not be recognized as against creditors not resident in the forum
of discharge and taking no part in the proceedings.5 Even if it
be conceded that "A discharge in insolvency under a state law
.barred only creditors who were citizens or residents of the state,
or those who appeared in the insolvency court to prove their
claims or were otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court
of insolvency," 8 it has been pointed out, in a searching.study, that
such a doctrine overlooks the fact that bankruptcy jurisdiction
does not require personal service on creditors either resident or
nonresident, and in effect defeats the purpose of bankruptcy
legislation" It has also been affirmatively asserted that this doc-
trine is "wholly inapplicable" to contracts and discharges in for-
eign countries, or discharges in the United States of debts owed
to foreign creditors.3
Under federal acts prior to 1898, it has been held that where a
debt is both contracted and payable in this country, a discharge
in bankruptcy here will be a good plea in bar to a subsequent suit
for the debt brought in the courts of this country by a foreign
creditor. A foreign creditor has thus been held barred by a local
discharge in bankruptcy where suing in a local forum on a local
judgment debt obtained by the foreign creditor on a contract
made and to be performed here, where both parties were resident
at the time.9 It is uncertain whether under earlier acts a local
discharge was effective to bar suit by a foreign creditor in a local
forum for debts either contracted or payable in the United States.
Such a discharge has been held effective where the foreign cred-
itor was suing on a debt contracted abroad by a resident of the
United States, it not appearing where the debt was payable;20
where it neither appeared where the debt was contracted nor
where it was payable; = where the foreign creditor was suing on
a foreign judgment for a balance due on a 'uffalo contract." =
Commentaries to this section state that "A discharge under the federal
bankruptcy act does not discharge the debts of nonresident aliens."
5 fmro, op. cit- supra note 1, § 191. It is uncertain whether Minor
meant merely that -where there is no personal jurisdiction over the foreign
creditor the discharge will not be recognized elsewhere, or whether he also
thought that in such a case the discharge would not be effective against the
foreign creditor even in the forum of discharge.
cCoNmCT or LAws B S P AEMNT No. 4 (Am. L. Inst 1928) § 39S(b).
That such a doctrine was 'very generally accepted"Ieven in the courts of
the state -where the discharge was granted, see Bailey, op. cit. supre note 1.
7Bailey, op. cif. upra note 1.
s SToY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 340-341.
9Pattison & Co. v. Wilbur, fO R. I 448 (1873).
io Zarega's Case, Fed. Cas. No. 18,204 (S. D. N. Y. 1842).
"Ruiz v. Eickerman, 5 Fed. 790 (E. D. Mo. 1881).
1More v. Horton, 39 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 393 (1884). The court held that
1930]
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The cases are apparently divided as to whether a discharge
here bars a debt due a foreign creditor where the debt was
neither contracted nor payable here. In McDougall v. Page,13
decided under the act of 1867, it was expressly held that a dis-
charge under a federal bankruptcy act does not bar the local en-
forcement of a debt owed to a resident of a foreign country under
a contract entered into and made payable in the latter country
the creditor having been in no way a party to the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. The decision was seemingly based on the ground that,
undei! authority to discharge "all debts which were or might be
proved" against the bankrupt's estate, the bankruptcy court had
no jurisdiction to discharge debts contracted and payable else-
where, unless such debts were expressly included within the
terms of the statute. On the other hand, a debt contracted and
payable in a foreign country and reduced to judgment there has
been held barred by a discharge here, so as to preclude suit here
by the foreign creditor on the judgment.14 Butt it must be con-
fessed that the force of the latter decision is considerably weak-
ened by the fact that it was reluctantly decided on the authority
of Murray v. De Rottenham,25 where the court expressly declined
to decide the question, and by' the fact that there is strong lan-
guage supporting the view taken in McDougall v. Page."0
The primary question in all these cases would seem to be, what
debts did the local bankruptcy court have jurisdiction to bar?
the suit was "upon the original contract, which was not merged in the for-
eign judgment."
13 55 Vt. 187, 200 (1882): 11.. the court granting the discharge in bank-
ruptcy had jurisdiction neither of the plaintiffs nor of their debts. The ob-
ligatory force of said debts, therefore, is in nowise impaired by said dis-
charge in the country where they were contracted and payable."
Of. Lizardi v. Cohen, 3 Gill. 480 (Md 1845), sometimes cited for the
same proposition but merely holding, in passing upon the interest of a wit-
ness, that a discharge of the debtor here does not extinguish in England a
debt contracted and payable there, without passing on the question of
whether or not the discharge would be effective in the United States. To
like effect see M'Menomy v. Murray, 3 Johns. Ch. 435 (N. Y. 1818).
1 Ritchie v. Garrison, 10 Abb. Prac. 246 (N. Y. 1858) (Bankruptcy Act
of 1841). Cf. also Zarega's Case, supra, note 10; Ruiz v. Eickerman,
supra, note 11; Moore v. Horton, supra. note 12.
as 6 Johns. Ch. 52 (N. Y. 1822) (Bankruptcy Act of 1800).
'16 "If the point was open, I should conclude that when the law of a state
will give no effecb to a foreign discharge in relation to a debt contractedl
within its own dominion, the rule of justice, comity, and reason, dictates
that it should not support a discharge against a debt contracted elsewhere;
and especially when its statute of discharge was passed after the debt
was due. The reverse) is a rule contrary tq the all-predominant doctrine
of the lex loci contractus, and contrary to every idea of the relations
which creditor and debtor could have imagined were to exist between them,




Obviously, it is entirely within the power of Congress to provide
that a local discharge shall bar any and all debts, even debts con-
tracted and payable elsewhere, and although such a discharge
might not be respected at the plhce of the contract or in some
third country,7 it would be an effective bar to suit in this coun-
ta7. s Especially is this true if the discharge be considered as
merely affecting the "remedy" but not the "right." 10 The ques-
tionis manifestly one of statutory interpretation. Contrary to
the interpretation adopted in McDougall v. Page, it has been in-
timated that, to bar both foreign as well as domestic creditors,
express language in the local bankruptcy statute extending its
operation to foreign creditors is unnecessary "when the language
of the statute is otherwise sufficiently general and comprehensive,
and when the evident policy of the law is to embrace all debts
that can be proved under the commission, and to give the un-
fortunate merchant, who conducts himself fairly, new credit in
the commercial world and new capacity for business."20
McDougaU v. Page, which is the only ease found where aforeign
creditor suing in the local forum was held not barred by a local
discharge, cannot therefore be interpreted as holding that it is
beyond the power of the United States to bar locally a debt con-
tracted and payable elsewhere, but merely as a construction of
the act then in force as not being applicable to such a debt.
At least in cases where the debt is construed as within the
jurisdiction of the local bankruptcy court, the foreign creditor by
bringing suit in the forum which granted the discharge is held to
waive any extraterritorial immunity he may have possessed.2 '
-17 See I' Menomy v. Murray, supra note 13.
'sJudge Story observes: "if the State, by its own laws should aprovide
that a discharge of an insolvent debtor, under its own laws, shall be a dis-
charge of all contracts, even of those madq in a: foreign country, its own
courts would be bound by such provision." STORY, op. cit. oupra note 3,
§ 347.
9 "A discharge goes to the remedy; it does not cancel the debt. It destroys
the remedy on all debts except those falling -within the terms of the sec-
tion." 1 COLTmE, BAmuRpTm (13th ed. 1923) 596.
See also the remarks of Story, T., in Van Reimsdyck v. Kane, 28 Fed.
Cas. 1062 (C. C. R. 1: 1812), comparing statutes of limitations and bank-
ruptcy discharges as affecting the "right" or "remedy" of a contract
20 Chancellor Kent, in Murray v. De Bottenham, supra note 15, at 5F;
cf. A'TMenomy v. Murray, supra note 13, at 440: "A bankrupt or insolvent
act ought not to be presumed to have been intended to reach foreign con-
tracts unless it be so declared."
-"And the plaintiffs by suing in one court subject themselves to the lez
for, and cannot deny here the legal effect of the discharge under our laws."
Pattison & Co. v. Wilbur, supra note 9, at 455.
"An insolvent law or bankrupt law has no extraterritorial force. If the
foreign party sues, despite the insolvent or bankrupt discharge in the law
of the forum, he must accept the rules pertaining thereto .... Of course
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It is said to be immaterial that the discharge in this country
would not protect the bankrupt from a foreign suit. Accord-
ingly, it has been held that in a foreign suit brought on a local
contract which had been "discharged" here the bankrupt's ap-
pearance and failure to plead his discharge does not prevent his
subsequently setting up the discharge in bar to a suit brought
here on the foreign judgment.2 But where a deed of trust was
conditioned upon the payment of debts contracted and payable
abroad, or upon the exoneration or discharge of the debtor, and
the court construed the condition as contemplating only a dis-
charge through some personal act of the foreign creditors, and a
discharge which should be "absolute," the court, without deciding
whether the discharge would bar a suit here for the foreign
debts, held that the discharge did not satisfy the terms of the
deed of trust because the discharge would not be effective in Ger-
many where the debts were contracted and payable.23
Where there is no doubt but that the debt is within the purview
of the local discharge, the fact that the foreign creditor did not
prove his debt, appear, or consent to, or approve the local pror
ceedings in bankruptcy, has been held immaterial,24 especially
where there is evidence of his refusal to participate in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and a declining in advance of composition
there can be extraterritorial operation of a United States statute as to the
discharge of personal obligation. "When the intraterritorial law has
granted such a discharge as to all creditors, the foreign creditor suing
in the domestic tribunal is subject to the lex fw-i, and his right to sue is
dependent -thereon... The discharge in bankruptcy is valid in the absence
of fraud, in whatever court of the United States a suit is brought, altho
it may not protect the defendant from a suit brought in a foreign juris-
diction, if he should be found therein." Ruiz v. Eickernan, upr note
11, at 790.
Compare remarks of -the court in McDougall v. Page, supra note 13.22 Moore v. Horton, supr, note 12.
"If the defendant had pleaded his discharge in the Canadian suit it would
have been unavailing to him as a defense. It serves as a complete defense
in actions prosecuted in the courts of this state, as to all debts existing at
the time he filed his petition, by force and operation of our own laws. In
a legal sense the cause of action here is the same as that upon which the
action was prosecuted in the Canadian courts. It is a suit upon the original
contract which was not merged in the foreign judgment." Ibid. 396. Cf.
Pattison v. Wilbur, supra note 9, where a contract made here by residents
and to be performed here -was held merged in a judgment obtained on it
here by a party who had become a resident of a foreign country at the time
of the judgment. This holding, however, was obviously immaterial to the
result reached.23 M'Menomy v. Murray, supra note 13.
"It is sufficient to say, that a contract made in a foreign country, and to
be governed and discharged by its laws, cannot be 'absolutely' discharged
by the statute of another country to which the parties have not bound them-
selves to submit." "Ibid. 440.24 Cases cited supra notes 9-12, 14.
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notes, such conduct being a "waiver" which "estops" him from
making objection to the validity of the discharge.F5 Where, as
in' McDougall v. Page, the debt is constr ued as not within the
local discharge, the effect of the foreign debtor's voluntary par-
ticipation in the local proceedings has not been passed upon, but
there is dicta to the effect that such participation would bar sub-
sequent suit here for the debt.20
B. Unaer the Nat onw Bakr-uptc-j Act of 1898
The bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 provides that "A discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, except such as.... (3) have not been duly scheduled in
time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if
known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy." 27 The act also
refers to the claims of those residing without the United States
as entitled to share in the dividends declared, at least where the
debtor has also been "adjudged a bankrupt by a court without
the United States." The jurisdiction conferred on "courts of
bankruptcy" by the act includes the power "to, adjudge persons
bankrupt... who do not have their principal place of business,
reside, or have their domicile within the United States; but have
property within their jurisdictions, or who have been adjudged
bankrupts by courts of competent jurisdiction without the United
States and have property within their jurisdiction." 2
The conclusion to be drawn from these provisions seems to be
that "provable debts" due to foreign creditors, regardless x)f
where contracted or payable, when properly scheduled, are dis-
charged, so far as Congress has the power to enact that such a
result shall follow. That Congress has the power so to provide,
as far as future proceedings in this country are concerned, "has
mot been questioned and is not open to doubt" 30
25Ioore v. .Horton, supra note 12.
26 WiAenomy v. Murray, supra note 13, at 440, to the effect that where
debts are contracted and payable in a foreign country, a discharge by the
bankrupt law of this country will not discharge the debtor from those
debts, "unless those foreign creditors have assented to that proceeding by
coming in and proving their debts under the commission."
2T30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (1926).
2sUWhenever a person shall have been adjudged a banaupt by a court
-without the United States and also by a court of bankruptcy, creditors re-
siding Within the United States shall first be paid a dividend equal to that
received in the court without the United States by other ceditors before
creditors who have received a dividend in such court shall be paid any
amounts." 30 STAT. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 105 (d). (1926).
230 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (1) (1926).
3ofIn Morency v. Landry, 79 N. H. 305, 108 At. 855, 9 A. L. R. 127
(1919), it was argued that -while Congress might enact such a law it has
mot done so. The court said:
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But there is a paucity of authority on the question under the
present act for which it is difficult to account, especially in view
of the great growth of international intercourse since 1898. Only
one adjudicated case on the point since the adoption of the pres-
ent Bankruptcy Act has come to light. In Morerncy v. Lwnffy,1
a discharge under the Act of 1898 was-held to bar an action for
reimbursement brought by a foreign surety who had paid a joint
foreign judgment against himself and the bankrupt principal.
The court took the position that although the discharge might
not be recognized extraterritorially, the statute was a limitation
of remedy applicable to both domestic and foreign creditors suing
in the forum of discharge, and that such an interpretation works
no injustice tb the foreign creditor suing here.2- To quote from
the opinion:
"Where the bankrupt is sued on a debt existing at the time of
filing the petition, the introduction of the order makes out a
prima facie defense, the burden being then cast upon the plain-
tiff to show that, because of the nature of the claim, failure to
give notice or other statutory reason, the debt sued on was by law
excepted from the operation of the discharge."
"The chief contention made in favor of this conclusion is that prior to
the enactment of the present statute earlier bankruptcy acts containing
provisions of similar purport had been construed as not affecting the right
of the non-participating foreign creditor to thereafter maintain a suit in
our courts. Hence it is said that Congress intended to express a like pur-
pose here.
"The plaintiff's argument is based upon an erroneous assumption as to
the state of the law in 1898, and takes a narrow and mistaken view' of the
purposes intended to be effected by the legislation in question. The statute
plainly applies to the case in hand, and the plaintiff's rights here are no
greater than they would be if the creditor had resided in the United States.'
Ibid. 306, 108 Atl. at 856.
32 Supra note 30.
32"The argument that a law making the discharge efficient locally as to
a foreign creditor gives the domestic creditor undue advantages, compels
the foreign creditor to pursue his debtor into other lands and undertakes to
make a foreign discharge effective in another country where the creditor
resides, is based upon a misconception of the effect of the discharge, so
far as it relates to foreign creditors who do not participate in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Such creditors are not thereby compelled to pursue
their debtor into foreign lands. But if they do so putsue him they are
bound by the limitation of remedy which applies to those resident there.
Neither does the law undertake to make the discharge effective against the
creditor in proceedings brought at his residence in Canada. It merely
places him on an equality with our own citizens in proceedings in our courts.
It is manifest that such a law is not so devoid of just principle that it is




II. EFFECT OF A FOREIGN DISCHARGE IN BANRUIPTOY ON DEBTS DUE
LOCAL CREDITORS
Story's broad proposition that "a discharge from the contract
according to the laws of the place where it is made or to be per-
formed is good everywhere and extinguishes the contract," -3 was
quite obviously intended to set out the principle governing for-
eign discharjes of debts due local creditors as well as local dis-
charges of debts due foreign creditors. It has been asserted,
however, that "A discharge under the law of a foreign country
will not discharge the debt due American creditors who were not
party to the proceedings." 3- It is sufficient to say that the cases
do not support such a proposition, and in general tend rather to
support Story's view.
It is well-settled that a discharge in bankruptcy obtained in a
foreign country by a person residing therein from a debt both
contracted and payable 3 in such country will bar a subsequent
action here for the debt by a local creditor.3 .A fortiwor, this is
true where the creditor proved his debt and received a dividend
under the foreign commission,37 where both debtor and creditor
are citizens of the country granting the dischargei and, es-
pecially where such creditor has received his dividend in the for-
eign proceedings. 0 It has been urged that because a foreign
assignee or trustee in bankruptcy cannot recover property of the
bankrupt in this country as against local attaching creditors that
the foreign decree should not be a bar to suit here for a debt
barred by the foreign discharge, but this argument has not pre-
vailed.40 The real basis for giving effect to the foreign discharge,
33 STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 335; see WHAnTON, op. cit supr, note 1,
§ 804. For the English view, see Dzc-y, CONxFwCT op LAWS (3d ed. 1922)
477-485, 847 n. 18; WEsTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1912)
§§ 240-242a; LoRENzEN, Zoc. cit. supra note 1.
3* CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEIENT No. 4 (Am. L. Inst 1928) § 398;
see WHARTON, op. cit. .pra note 1, § 804.
a In Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698 (1854), a note payable generally with-
out any place of payment specified was held payable ab the place where
made. See the contention in the dissenting opinion of Pierrepont, J., in
Olyphant v. Atwood, supra note 2, at 464, to the efFect that, in determining
the place -where a bill of exchange is contracted, the place 'where the original
debt for 'which the bill -was given %as contracted is of importance as well
as the place of acceptance.
3 May v. Breed, 61 Mass. 15 (1851) ; Olyphant v. Atwood; Very v. Mc-
Henry, both svpra. note 2; Long v. Hammond, 40 Me. 204 (1855) ; Peck v.
Hibbard, 26 Vt. 698 (1854).
37 Norris v. Breed, 61 Mass. 44 (1851).
a$ Harris v. Mandeville, 2 Dell. 256 -(Pa. 1796).
9 9Matter of Coates, 3 Abb. Dec. 231 (N. Y. 1856), reversing In re Coates
and Hilliard, 13 Barb, 452 (N. Y. 1852). But compare the effect of par-
tidipation in a French concordat. Matter of Bonaffd, 23 N. Y. 169 (1861).
40 "We have been strongly pressed by the argument that, inasmuch as
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however, is not because of any extraterritorial force ex proprio
vigore of the discharge under the foreign law, as is sometimes in-
timated,41 but purely, as in all questions of foreign law, an ex-
tension of international courtesy or Comity.42 -Accordingly, the
courts of this country may on various grounds refuse to give ef-
fect to the foreign law and to the discharge obtained under it.
Thus recognition has been refused to a discharge at the place
where the debt was contracted and payable where the provisions
of the act under which the discharge was granted were con-
sidered unfair and inequitable to local creditors, and where the
foreign statute was a mere temporary relief-of-debtors law which
assignees of an English bankrupt cannot sue for and recover debts due the
bankrupt, therefore the bankrupt law has no extraterritorial operation, and
cannot give effect to a certificate of discharge when set up hero in bar by
an English bankrupt. But we cannot perceive the force of this reasoning.'
The two things are not irreconcilable; they stand on different grounds, and
depend on different and distinct principles;" Way v. Breed, supra note 36,
at 41.
This language is disapproved by the New York Court of Appeals in
Phelps v. Borland, supra note 2, at 412, 9 N. E. at 310, where the
drawer of a bill of exchange accepted and payable in England was held
discharged from his "secondary liability" on the instrument by the volun-
tary participation by the holder in thd English bankruptcy proceedings of
the drawee-acceptor. The right of the holder to proceed (through the Eng-
lish trustee) against any property here had he not accepted the bankrauptcy
dividend was said to be "a valuable right" to which it was "the privilege of
the surety to succeed by way of subrogation whenever he should pay the
debt, and the plaintiffs could not deprive him of it or impair or destroy It,
except at the peril of releasing him from his liability. Just that- was what
the plaintiff did... The creditor having by his own voluntary act released
the debtor from all remaining liability his surety is discharged." It was
intimated o0iter, however, that the surety might consent to the principal's
acceptance of the dividend and thus waive his rights.
43 In the Olyphant case, supra note 2, at 464, it was said that it is un-
necessary to resort to any "presumption of assent on the part of the credi-
tor to be bound by a law which discharges the contract. The true rule is,
that the law of the place of the contract absolutely governs it, proprio
vgore, in all respects; it not only gives it life and determines the extent
of its obligation, but prescribes the mode of its execution and how it
may, and in certain circumstances shall, be satisfied."
-2-... The law of the place of the contract, which may be called the
law of the contract, gives it its character, makes it what it is, fixes its
limits and obligation, fixing the time when it shall commence, how it shall
be executed and satisfied, and how it shall be terminated and discharged.
When, therefore, such a contract is discharged, by force of the same law
which gave it its origin and effect, it is extinguished, and no longer exists
as a contract. When, therefore, a remedy is sought upon it in the tribunals
of another country, the same international comity which permits the credi-
tor to demand damages for its nonperformance ought to permit the defend-
ant to show that the obligation no longer exists." May v. Breed, supr
note 36, at 37.
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the court construed as being inapplicable to debts due local cred-
itors.43
Where the decree of a foreign court is interposed to judicial
proceedings here, the jurisdiction of such court may properly be-
come a matter of inquiry, and if it is found that the foreign court
had no jurisdiction, its decree will not be a bar. The mere fact
that a contract was made and was to be performed in the coun-
try granting the discharge has been held insufficient to confer
jurisdiction where the debtor was not resident in that countryA'
A discharge in England has been held not to bar suit here on a
bill of exchange accepted and payable in England brought by
French creditors who were not resident or domiciled in England,
and neither voluntarily became parties to the proceedings in
bankruptcy in England nor received any dividend under the
English bankruptcy act.
In all of the cases in which effect has been given in this coun-
trT to a foreign discharge, the place of contracting and place of
performance were the same4 Where the locuS contra chis and the
lous solutionis are different, it has not been determined where
the discharge must occur to be given effect here. It is said to be
"well-established," however, that "the discharge of a contract by
the law of the place where the contract was not made, or to be
performed, will not be a discharge in any other country." 47 The
United States Supreme Court has held in M'Millan . PMNeifl
that "a discharge under a foreign law is no bar to an action on
a contract made in this country." And where it did not appear
where the contract was to be performed, a foreign discharge has
been held ineffective as a plea in bar where the defendant failed
to prove that the contract Was made within the jurisdiction sub-
ject to the laws of the country of discharge, especially where the
contract had been 'merged" in a judgment recovered in this
country before the date of the foreign discharge.l
This refusal to give effect here to a foreign discharge where
the debt was neither made nor to be performed in the place of
discharge cannot, however, be taken to afford any basis for
4 3 Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20 (1816).
41 Long v. Hammond, 40 Me. 204 (1855) ; of. Olyphant v. Atwood, supra
note 2, where a discharge in England of a debt contracted and payable
there -was held a bar to suit here -where the debtor, though a citizen of
the United States, waq resident in England at the time of discharge.
45 Munroe v. Guilleaumne, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 834 (N. Y. 1866). The basis
of this decision seems to be that, the English statute not having been proved
in evidence, the presumption is that the discharge -was not a bar of such a
debt even in England.
46 Cases cited supra note 26.
47 STo.Y, op. cit. suprm note 3, § 342.
48 4 Wheat. 209 (U. S. 1819).
49 Green v. Sarmiento, Fed. Cas. No. 5,760 (C. C. D. Pa. 1810).
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arguing that the United States cannot or should not give effect
locally to a local discharge of all "provable debts" including debts
neither contracted nor payable here. As pointed out by Chan-
cellor Kent in Murray v. De Rottenham:
"There is a wide distinction between a discharge under the
authority of the government where the suit is brought, and a
discharge obtained abroad, which has no authority here, and is
admissible only upon the ground of comity. In the latter case,
a wide range is given to the operation of considerations growing
out of the special circumstances of the case, or springing from
enlarged views of justice and international policy. In the former,
we have only to look -to the fair and reasonable interpretation of
the statute, and to give effect to its intention." 1o
Thus a foreign discharge will be effective as a bar to( a suit di-
this country by a local creditor at least where the debt is con-
tracted and payable at. the place granting the discharge. But
"care must be taken .to distinguish between cases where by the
lex loci contractus there is a virtual'or direct extinguishment of
the debt itself; and where there is only a partial extinguishment
of the remedy thereon..." 5
There are also certain pleading cautions to be observed in order
to make the foreign discharge effective as a bar. The burden is
on the foreign debtor to show, in the first instance, that he was
within the provisions of the bankruptcy laws whose protection
he invokes. The plea in bar has been held ineffective to bar suit
here, though the contract was made and was to be performed in
the country granting the discharge, where the plea did not
properly set forth the different acts of the foreign government
o Supra note 15, at 59.
51 STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 338.
It seems that proceedings under the French bankruptcy system do not
effect the absolute discharge of the debtor but that its extent depends upon
the interpretation of the composition between the debtor and his creditors.
Where it does not appear that the creditor participated in the concordat,
the concordat is not a good defense to a suit hefe to recover a debt con-
tracted in France. Morel v. Garelly, 16 Abb. Prac. 269 (N. Y. 1863). Even
French creditors who were parties to a concordat or composition with
creditors made in France where the debtor resided have been allowed to
share in the distribution of the debtor's estate in the United States, as such
a concordat evidently does not discharge the claim of any creditor to share
in the existing property of the debtor. But all sums received by the foreign
creditors under the concordat will be deducted from the amount they are
entitled to receive out of property here, so that all the creditors may share
equally in the distribution of the nonresident debtor's estate. Matter of
Bonaff6, supra note 39. The same result would be reached under section
65-(d) of the Bankruptcy Act 6f 1898 even under a foreign discharrgo.
It is possible that Illustration (a) under the Comment to CONFLICT or
LAws RESTATEMENT No. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 398, may have been
prompted by a misconception of the nature of the French system.
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under which the discharge was obtained.52 It has also been held
that, in order to be admissible in evidence under the plea in bar,
the foreign certificate of discharge must show when the defend-
ant became a bankrupt, when the fiat in bankruptcy was issued,
and that the debts in suit were provable claims.F3 Where an
answer which sets up foreign bankruptcy proceedings in bar
alleges fact9 6ntitling the defendant to a foreign certificate of.
discharge but does not allege that such a certificate was issued
and obtained, a motion to make the answer more definite may
be granted.5'
There have been no decisions in this country. since the enact-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 passing upon the question
of what debts due local creditors will be barred by a foreign dis-
charge. Presumably, however, the authority of decisions antedat-
ing the act upon the question has been in nowise changed or im-
paired by any provisions in the act.
SUM1ARY
By way of generalization and summary, it may be stated that:
(1) Discharges under federal bankruptcy acts prior to 1898
have been held to bar debts due foreign creditors which were
both contracted and payable in the United States, at least locally,
irrespective of the fact that such a discharge might not be recog-
nized extraterritorially.
(2) Under federal bankruptcy acts prior to 1898, there was
some doubt as to whether a discharge was effective even locally
to bar debts due foreign creditorg which were either contracted
or payable, or neither contracted nor payable in the United
States. Under the Act of 1898, however, a discharge .bars all
"provable debts" which are properly scheduled, apparently re-
Z
2 Peck v. Hibbard, supra note 35; Munroe v. Guilleaume, suprn& note 45.
= Mansfield v. Andrews, 41 Me. 591 (1856).
7 Philipe v. James, 26 X. Y. Super. Ct. '120 (1865) (motion to make more
specific granted and amended answer held insufficient on demurrer).
"Where a defendant relies upon a discharge in bankruptcy in another
country as a bar to the action, or as in this case, upon a certificate of a
commissioner in bankruptcy,... he must set forth in his answer: First,
The statute under which the dileged proceedings were had, and certificate
was granted... That was not done in this case and the answer is there-
fore defective. Second, The answer, besides pleading the certificate, must
set forth, with particularity, such prior proceedings as -warranted the grant-
ing of the certificate. If no certificate has been granted, and enough has
been done to e\tinguish the plaintiff's cause of action, the material facts
relied upon as affecting the e.xtinguislunent, or the defendant's discharge
from liability musrt be pleaded. If a certificate has been granted, it must
be pleaded, and other facts be alleged which, if true, authorize the iranting
of it." Ibid. 722.
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gardless of whether the creditor is a resident and regardless of
where the debt was contracted and where it was payable.
(3) As a matter of comity, a discharge under a foreign bank-
ruptcy law will be held to bar suit in the United States by local
creditors for debts contracted and payable in the country grant-
ing the discharge, but such a discharge will not bar debts neither
contracted nor payable at the place of discharge. Where the dis-
charge must occur to be recognized as a bar in the United States
of debts due local creditors when the place of contracting and the
place of payment are not coincident has not been determined.
